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How	 does	 mathematics	 apply	 to	 something	 non-mathematical?	 We	
distinguish	between	a	general	application	problem	and	a	special	application	
problem.	 A	 critical	 examination	 of	 the	 answer	 that	 structural	 mapping	
accounts	offer	 to	the	 former	problem	leads	us	to	 identify	a	 lacuna	 in	these	
accounts:	 they	have	 to	 presuppose	 that	 target	 systems	 are	 structured	 and	
yet	 leave	this	presupposition	unexplained.	We	propose	to	 fill	 this	gap	with	
an	account	that	attributes	structures	to	targets	through	structure	generating	
descriptions.	These	descriptions	are	physical	descriptions	and	so	there	is	no	
such	thing	as	a	solely	mathematical	account	of	a	target	system.		
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representation;	isomorphism;	physical	descriptions.	
	
	
	
1.	Introduction	
	
Much	of	modern	science	 is	highly	mathematized.	Physicists	represent	quantum	
phenomena	with	Hilbert	 spaces;	 population	biologists	 represent	predator-prey	
systems	 using	 coupled	 differential	 equations;	 and	 economists	 represent	 the	
beliefs	 and	 desires	 of	 human	 agents	 with	 real-valued	 functions.	 The	 question	
then	 is:	 how	 does	 mathematics	 apply	 to	 the	 physical	 and	 social	 worlds?	 This	
question	 has	 been	 on	 the	 horizon	 at	 least	 since	 Galileo	 (1623/1957,	 p.	 238)	
noted	that	the	book	of	nature	was	written	in	the	language	of	mathematics,	and	it	
acquired	notoriety	when	Wigner	declared	 that	 the	 “unreasonable	 effectiveness	
of	mathematics”	in	science	was	“something	bordering	on	the	mysterious	and	that	
there	 is	 no	 explanation	 for	 it”	 (1960,	 p.	 2).	 The	 question	 is	 central	 to	 the	
philosophy	of	science	but	has	implications	beyond,	for	example	in	the	philosophy	
of	 mathematics	 where	 the	 Quine-Putnam	 indispensability	 argument	 takes	 the	
successful	 application	 of	 mathematics	 in	 science	 to	 deliver	 ontological	
conclusions	regarding	the	status	of	mathematical	entities.		
	
A	 prominent	 answer	 to	 the	 question	 has	 emerged	 within	 the	 structuralist	
approach	to	the	nature	of	scientific	theories.	The	basic	idea	of	this	account,	which	
Pincock	 (2004)	 aptly	 calls	 the	 mapping	 account,	 is	 that	 a	 theory	 provides	
mathematical	structures	and	that	these	structures	apply	to	the	physical	world	in	
virtue	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 structure	 preserving	 mapping	 (henceforth	 a	
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morphism)	 that	 relates	 the	 mathematical	 structure	 with	 the	 structure	 of	 the	
physical	 system(s)	 to	 which	 the	 theory	 applies.	 	 The	 aim	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 to	
examine	 this	account	of	 the	application	of	mathematics.	Our	conclusion	will	be	
that	 it	 offers	 only	 a	 partial	 answer.	 For	 such	 morphisms	 to	 be	 well-defined,	
physical	 systems	 need	 to	 exhibit	 structures	 and	 without	 an	 account	 of	 where	
these	 structures	 come	 from	 the	 account	 remains	 incomplete.	 In	 this	 paper	we	
provide	 a	 positive	 answer,	 namely	 that	 these	 structures	 are	 the	 result	 of	
abstracting	 away	 the	 physical	 aspects	 of	 what	 we	 call	 structure	 generating	
descriptions:	descriptions	of	physical	 systems	 that	 refer	 to	physical	objects	and	
physical	 properties	 and	 relations.	 We	 call	 this	 the	 extensional	 abstraction	
account.	
	
We	proceed	as	 follows.	 In	Section	2	we	point	out	that	there	 is	no	such	thing	as	
“the”	 problem	 of	 the	 application	 of	 mathematics	 and	 distinguish	 between	
multiple	intertwined	problems	concerning	the	use	of	mathematics	in	science.	In	
Section	3	we	introduce	the	mapping	account	and	present	what	we	take	to	be	the	
strongest	 formulation	 of	 it.	 In	 Section	 4	 we	 examine	 existing	 suggestions	 of	
where	the	physical	structures	needed	for	the	mapping	account	might	be	found,	
and	 argue	 that	 they	 don’t	 stand	 up	 to	 scrutiny.	 In	 Section	 5	 we	 present	 a	
suggestion	of	how	to	fill	this	gap,	and	in	Section	6	we	offer	concluding	remarks	
concerning	mathematical	 explanation,	 nominalism,	 and	how	our	 account	 could	
be	 put	 to	 use	 in	 the	 context	 of	 philosophies	 of	 mathematics	 other	 than	
structuralism.		
	
	
2.	Defining	the	Problem	
	
Representations	 of	 target	 systems	 offered	 by	 scientific	 models	 and	 theories	
crucially	 involve	 mathematical	 structures.3	These	 mathematical	 structures	 are	
applied	to	physical	systems	in	a	way	that	allows	scientists	to	convert	reasoning	
about	 the	 structures	 into	 reasoning	 about	 the	 systems	 to	 which	 they	 apply.	
Consider	 the	 simple	 example	 of	 a	 population	 of	 rabbits.	 Suppose	 you	want	 to	
know	 how	 fast	 the	 population	 grows	 and	 to	 this	 end	 you	 construct	 a	
mathematical	 model	 of	 the	 population.	 One	 way	 to	 reason	 about	 such	 a	
population	 is	 to	 count	 the	 rabbits	 at	 a	 particular	 time,	 observe	 their	 breeding	
behaviour,	and	then	formulate	a	rule	about	how	the	population	grows.	A	simple	
rule	is	that	the	rabbits	form	discrete	generations	and	that	the	population	doubles	
every	 time	 a	 new	 generation	 appears	 (for	 instance	 every	 six	 months).	 Under	
these	 assumptions	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 population	 is	 given	 by	 the	 rule	 nt+1 = 2nt 	
where	 nt 	is	 the	size	of	the	population	at	time	t.	 	 It	 follows	from	this	rule	that	 if	
one	has	two	rabbits	now,	one	will	have	32	rabbits	in	two	years	time.4		
																																																								
3	For	the	purpose	of	this	paper	it	is	not	necessary	to	take	a	stance	on	whether	models	or	theories	
are	the	units	of	scientific	representation,	nor	does	it	matter	whether	models	should	be	identified	
with	 mathematical	 structures	 (for	 a	 discussion	 of	 these	 issues	 see	 our	 (2017)).	 Our	 point	 of	
departure	here	is	the	hopefully	uncontroversial	observation	that	whatever	does	the	representing	
often	involves	mathematics.			
4	We	 note	 that	 our	 choice	 of	 example	 is	 inline	 with	 much	 of	 the	 recent	 discussion	 on	 the	
applicability	of	mathematics	where	examples	from	biology	have	occupied	centre	stage;	cf.	Baker’s	
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In	 formulating	 this	 model,	 a	 mathematical	 structure,	 in	 this	 case	 the	 natural	
numbers	 with	 a	 particular	 function	 defined	 on	 them,	 has	 been	 applied	 to	 a	
physical	 system,	 and	 this	 made	 it	 possible	 to	 convert	 reasoning	 about	 the	
structure	 into	 reasoning	 about	 the	 physical	 system	 itself.	 This	 invites	 the	
question	of	what	 is	 involved	 in	doing	 this.	Steiner	(1998,	pp.	24-47)	points	out	
that	the	question	about	the	application	of	mathematics	actually	breaks	down	into	
two	questions	that	need	to	be	disentangled.	We	agree	with	this	observation	and	
therefore	distinguish	between	what	we	call	the	general	application	problem	and	
the	special	application	problem.		
	
The	general	application	problem	 is	 this:	 in	 virtue	 of	what	 does	 a	mathematical	
structure	 apply	 to	 a	 target	 system?	 Two	 qualifications	 are	 needed.	 First,	 the	
structure	 referred	 to	 in	 the	question	could	be	any	mathematical	 structure.	The	
emphasis	 of	 question	 is:	 how	 does	mathematics	 hook	 onto	 something	 that	 (at	
least	on	 the	 face	of)	 it	 isn’t	mathematical,	namely	a	part	of	 the	physical	world.	
What	general	conditions	have	to	fall	into	place	for	this	to	happen?	Second,	there	
is	an	ambiguity	in	whether	“apply”	is	a	success	term	or	not.	There	are	numerous	
examples	where	mathematics	can	be	applied	to	a	physical	system,	but	in	such	a	
way	 that	 the	 claims	 that	 the	 mathematics	 can	 be	 used	 to	 generate	 about	 the	
physical	system	are	false.5	The	above	example	is	a	case	in	point	as	the	equation	
implies	 that	 the	 population	 continues	 to	 grow	 indefinitely,	 but	 of	 course	 the	
population	won’t	 grow	 indefinitely	because	 limited	 resources	will	 put	 a	bound	
on	 its	 size.6	To	regiment	usage,	we	will	use	 “apply”	 (and	 its	cognates)	 in	a	way	
that	is	neutral	with	respect	to	whether	or	not	the	application	at	hand	generates	
true	or	 false	 claims.	Where	 the	application	generates	 truths	we	use	 the	phrase	
“successful	 application”	 and	 where	 it	 generates	 falsehoods	 the	 phrase	
“unsuccessful	 application”.	 But	 both	 types	 of	 cases	 are	 still	 instances	 of	
mathematics	being	applied	to	the	physical	world.	
	
As	our	first	qualification	suggests,	there	is	another	question	one	can	ask,	namely:	
in	virtue	of	what	does	a	specific	(type	of)	mathematical	structure	apply	to	a	given	
(type	of)	target	system?	In	this	vein	one	can	ask,	 for	 instance,	 in	virtue	of	what	
the	 natural	 number	 structure	 applies	 to	 the	 rabbit	 population	 in	 the	 example	
above;	in	virtue	of	what	manifolds	apply	to	spacetime;	in	virtue	of	what	Hilbert	
spaces	apply	to	quantum	systems;	and	so	on.	We	call	this	the	special	application	
problem.	The	specific	problem	is	comparative:	for	a	given	(type	of)	target	system	
what	makes	one	type	of	mathematical	structure	apply	to	it	rather	than	another?	
Should	 the	 rabbit	 population	 be	 embedded	 into	 the	 natural	 numbers?	 The	
																																																																																																																																																														
cicadas	 (2005),	van	Fraassen’s	deer	counting	(2008,	Chapter	11),	and	Lyon	and	Colyvan’s	bees	
(2008).	
5	Generating	 a	 strictly	 speaking	 false	 claim	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 the	 application	 is	 completely	
unsuccessful.	Falsity	comes	 in	degrees,	and	so	does	being	an	unsuccessful	application.	There	 is	
clearly	a	 sense	 in	which	 some	applications	of	mathematics	generate	 claims	about	 systems	 that	
are	only	approximately	 true	 (e.g.	Newton’s	use	of	 calculus	 to	describe	planetary	motions),	 and	
yet	 one	 would	 not	 want	 to	 dismiss	 them	 as	 a	 unsuccessful	 tout	 court.	 However,	 quantifying	
degrees	of	success	(or	lack	thereof)	is	tantamount	to	giving	degrees	of	approximate	truth,	which	
is	a	problem	we	cannot	tackle	 in	this	paper.	For	a	review	see	Oddie’s	(2016).	We	would	 like	to	
thank	an	anonymous	referee	for	drawing	our	attention	to	this	issue.		
6	Pincock	(2012,	Chapter	7)	provides	numerous	more	realistic	examples	of	failed	applications.		
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rational	 numbers?	 The	 real	 numbers?	 What	 sort	 of	 function(s)	 should	
correspond	 to	 their	physical	 interbreeding	relations?	Should	 they	be	bounded?	
And	 so	 on.	 There	 are	multiple	 decisions	 to	 be	made	when	 determining	which	
mathematical	structure	should	be	applied	to	a	system	in	question,	and	how.		
	
There	 is	 a	 third	 problem	 that	 is	 often	 mentioned	 in	 connection	 with	 the	
applicability	 of	 mathematics:	 in	 virtue	 of	 what,	 if	 at	 all,	 do	 facts	 about	
mathematical	 structures	 explain	 physical	 facts?	 We	 call	 this	 the	 explanation	
problem.	This	problem	is	of	interest	for	at	least	two	reasons.	Firstly,	philosophers	
of	 science	 are	 interested	 in	 what	 scientific	 explanation	 is	 and	 the	 question	 of	
how,	 if	 at	 all,	 mathematics	 can	 function	 explanatory	 has	 implications	 for	 this	
broader	debate.	Second,	the	recent	literature	on	indispensability	arguments	for	a	
commitment	to	the	existence	of	mathematical	objects	has	focussed	explicitly	on	
whether	 or	 not	 mathematics	 plays	 an	 essential	 explanatory	 role,	 rather	 than	
merely	 featuring	 in	 our	 “best	 scientific	 theories”	 as	 per	 the	 original	 Quine-
Putnam	formulation	(for	a	clear	statement	of	this	see	Baker’s	(2009,	Section	2)).	
	
It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	 application	 problem,	 even	 if	 phrased	 in	 terms	 of	
successful	application,	 is	conceptually	prior	 to	 the	explanation	problem.	Before	
asking	whether	or	not	a	fact	about	a	mathematical	structure	explains	some	fact	
about	 a	 physical	 system	 we	 need	 to	 know	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 mathematical	
structure	applies	to	the	system	in	question.	The	examples	in	the	recent	literature	
–	e.g.	whether	or	not	facts	about	prime	numbers	are	essential	 in	explaining	the	
life	 cycles	 of	 cicadas	 (Baker	 2005);	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 Borsuk-Ulam	 theorem	
explains	the	fact	that	there	are	two	antipodal	points	on	the	Earth’s	surface	with	
the	same	temperature	and	barometric	pressure	(Colyvan	2001);	or	whether	or	
not	the	Honeycomb	conjecture	explains	why	bees	build	hexagonal	honeycombs	
(Lyon	 and	 Colyvan	 2008)	 –	 all	 presuppose	 that	 the	 relevant	 mathematical	
structures	 apply,	 and	 indeed	 apply	 successfully,	 to	 the	 physical	 system	 of	
interest.	It’s	then	an	additional	question	as	to	whether	or	not	the	facts	about	the	
structures	explain	facts	about	the	systems.			
	
In	this	paper	our	focus	is	on	the	general	applicability	problem.	We	only	make	a	
few	 remarks	 about	 the	 specific	 problem	 on	 the	 way	 and	 briefly	 touch	 on	 the	
explanation	 problem	 in	 Section	 6	 where	 we	 indicate	 how	 our	 answer	 to	 the	
general	application	problem	impacts	on	the	explanation	problem.			
	
	
3.	The	Mapping	Account	
	
The	 core	 idea	 of	 what	 has	 become	 known	 as	 the	mapping	 account	 is	 that	 a	
mathematical	 structure	 applies	 to	 a	 target	 system	 in	 virtue	 of	 there	 being	 a	
proposed	 structure-preserving	 mapping	 from	 the	 target	 system	 to	 the	
mathematical	 structure.	The	mathematical	 structure	 successfully	applies	 to	 the	
target	 system	 if	 the	mapping	 holds.	 Phrased	 in	 this	way	 it’s	 important	 to	 note	
that	the	proposal	of	the	mapping	answers	the	application	question	and	whether	
the	mapping	holds	adjudicates	whether	the	application	is	successful.		
	
The	 mapping	 account	 is	 phrased	 in	 terms	 of	 mathematical	 structures	 and	 it’s	
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important	 to	 be	 explicit	 about	 the	 notion	 of	 structure	 this	 presupposes. 7	
Structures	 are	 taken	 to	 be	 set-theoretic	 structures	 as	 used	 in	 logic	 and	model	
theory.	A	structure	in	that	sense	is	a	composite	entity	consisting	of	a	nonempty	
set	U 	of	objects	called	the	domain	(or	universe)	of	the	structure	and	a	nonempty	
indexed	set	R 	of	relations	 r 	on	U .	 It	 is	convenient	 to	write	 the	structure	as	an	
ordered	 tuple	S = U,R .8	For	 what	 follows	 it	 is	 important	 to	 be	 clear	 on	 the	
nature	of	 the	objects	 and	 relations	 that	make	up	 a	 set-theoretic	 structure.	The	
important	point	is	that	it	does	not	matter	what	the	objects	are	intrinsically.	The	
only	thing	that	matters	from	a	structural	point	of	view	is	that	there	are	so	and	so	
many	of	them.	All	we	need	are	dummies	or	placeholders.	Likewise	for	relations.	
It	 is	 irrelevant	what	the	relation	“in	 itself”	 is.	All	 that	matters	 from	a	structural	
point	 of	 view	 is	 between	 which	 objects	 it	 holds.	 For	 this	 reason,	 a	 relation	 is	
specified	 purely	 extensionally,	 that	 is,	 as	 class	 of	 ordered	 n-tuples	 and	 the	
relation	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	 nothing	 over	 and	 above	 this	 class.	 Thus	 understood,	
relations	have	no	properties	other	 than	those	that	derive	 from	this	extensional	
characterization,	such	as	transitivity,	reflexivity,	and	symmetry.		
	
Assume	now	 that	we	want	 to	 apply	 the	 structure	SM 	to	 a	 target	 system	T .	 On	
the	mapping	 account	 this	 involves	 proposing	 a	mapping	 f :T → SM 	such	 that	 f	
preserves	at	least	some	of	the	structure	of	T.	We	then	say	that	SM 	is	the	structure	
to	be	applied	and	that	 f 	is	the	mapping	that	anchors	 the	application	of	 SM .	The	
nature	 of	 f 	has	 been	 the	 subject	 matter	 of	 considerable	 debate	 with	
isomorphism,	isomorphic	embedding,	partial	isomorphism,	and	homomorphism	
being	 the	most	 common	 suggestions.9	We	 say	 that	SM 	and	T are	morphic	 if	 the	
proposed	morphism	relating	them	exists.		
	
This	 account	 of	 the	 applicability	 of	 mathematics	 is	 arguably	 implicit	 in	 many	
versions	 of	 the	 semantic	 view	 of	 theories,	 most	 notably	 in	 Suppes’,	 van	
Fraassen’s,	 the	 partial	 structures	 approach	 championed	 by	 Da	 Costa,	 French,	
Ladyman,	 and	 Bueno,	 and	 the	 Munich	 brand	 of	 structuralism	 due	 to	 Sneed,	
Stegmüller,	 Balzer	 and	 Moulines.10	Recent	 explicit	 statements	 and	 defences	 of	
the	 account	 have	 been	 offered	 by	 Pincock	 (2007,	 2004,	 2012)	 and	 Bueno	 and	
Colyvan	 (2011).	 For	 our	 current	 purposes	 we	 focus	 on	 Bueno	 and	 Colyvan’s	
discussion	 because	 their	 statement	 of	 the	 view	 is	 particularly	 helpful	 for	 a	
discussion	of	the	issues	we	are	interested	in.11		
																																																								
7	Explaining	 the	 application	 of	mathematics	 by	 appeal	 to	 structures	 looks	most	 natural	 in	 the	
context	of	structuralist	philosophy	of	mathematics	such	as	Shaprio’s	(1997)	or	Resnik’s	(1997).	
However,	the	mapping	account	does	not	presuppose	this	approach	to	mathematics	and	could	be	
adopted	by	proponents	of	other	accounts.	We	briefly	return	to	this	issue	in	Section	6.		
8	The	standard	notion	of	a	structure	is	introduced,	for	instance,	in	Hodges’	(1997)	and	Enderton’s	
(1972/2001).	We	note,	however,	that	in	the	context	of	logic	a	structure	is	sometimes	also	taken	
to	 include	 a	 language	 and	 an	 interpretation	 function,	 which	 are	 absent	 from	 the	 notion	 of	 a	
structure	as	used	in	the	current	context.		
9	For	 a	 discussion	 of	 these	 see,	 for	 instance,	 Suppes’	 (1960),	 van	 Fraassen’s	 (1980,	 2008),	 Da	
Costa	 and	 French’s	 (2003),	 French	 and	 Ladyman’s	 (1999),	 Bueno’s	 (2011),	 Bartels’	 (2006),	
Mundy’s	(1986),	Pero	and	Suárez’s	(2016).	
10	For	a	discussion	of	these	approaches	see	Portides’	(2017).	
11	It’s	worth	noting	here	that	Bueno	and	Colyvan	call	their	account	an	“inferential	account”	of	the	
application	of	mathematics	rather	than	a	“mapping	account”.	Whilst	it’s	true	that	their	account	is	
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Bueno	and	Colyvan	break	down	the	application	of	mathematics	into	three	steps	
(ibid.,	p.	353):	
	
(1) Immersion:	“the	first	step	consists	in	establishing	a	mapping	from	the	empirical	set	up	to	
a	convenient	mathematical	structure	[…]	several	mappings	can	do	the	job	here,	and	the	
choice	of	mapping	is	a	contextual	matter,	 largely	dependent	on	the	particular	details	of	
the	application.”		
(2) Derivation:	 “this	 step	 consists	 in	 drawing	 consequences	 from	 the	 mathematical	
formalism,	using	the	mathematical	structure	obtained	in	the	immersion	step	[…]	This	is,	
of	 course,	 the	 key	 point	 of	 the	 application	 process,	 where	 consequences	 from	 the	
mathematical	formalism	are	generated.”		
(3) Interpretation:	“finally	we	interpret	the	mathematical	consequences	that	were	obtained	
in	 the	 derivation	 step	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 initial	 empirical	 set	 up	 […]	 To	 establish	 an	
interpretation,	a	mapping	from	the	mathematical	structure	to	the	initial	empirical	set	up	
is	 needed.	 This	 mapping	 need	 not	 be	 simply	 the	 inverse	 of	 the	 mapping	 used	 in	 the	
immersion	 step—although,	 in	 some	 instances,	 this	may	well	 be	 the	 case.	 But,	 in	 some	
contexts,	we	may	have	a	different	mapping	from	the	one	that	was	used	in	the	immersion	
step.”	
	
In	 separating	 these	 three	 steps,	 Bueno	 and	 Colyvan	 elaborate	 on	 a	 simple	
mapping	 account	 in	 various	 important	 ways.	 Firstly,	 they	 are	 explicit	 that	 the	
choice	of	a	mapping	in	the	immersion	step	is	a	contextual	matter	and	therefore	
does	 not	 require	 that	 the	 same	 mapping	 (let	 alone	 isomorphism)	 be	 used	 in	
every	 instance	of	applying	mathematics.	This,	combined	with	 the	 fact	 that	 they	
allow	 for	 distinct	 mappings	 from,	 and	 to,	 the	 empirical	 set	 up	 allows	 for	
instances	 where	 the	mathematical	 structure	 contains	more	 structure	 than	 the	
empirical	one,	and	visa	versa	(ibid,	p.	356).12	Secondly,	they	argue	that	after	the	
immsersion	 step	 their	 account	 is	 flexible	 enough	 to	 accommodate	 multiple	
further	mappings	between	the	intitial	mathematical	structure	and	some	further	
structures,	and	 then	applying	 the	 further	 two	steps	 (ibid,	p.	354).	Thirdly,	 they	
argue	 that	 their	account	can	accommodate	 idealisations	via	 the	 introduction	of	
partial	 mappings	 (ibid,	 pp.	 356-363).	 Forthly,	 the	 argue	 that	 by	 allowing	 for	
pragmatic	and	contextual	considerations	to	determine	which	mapping	to	choose	
on	a	 case	by	case	basis	 they	make	 room	 for	 cases	where	novel	predictions	are	
generated	 by	 applying	mathematics.	 This	 happened,	 for	 instance,	 where	 Dirac	
choose	 to	 interpet	 negative	 solutions	 to	 the	 dirac	 equation	 as	 physically	
meaningful	 (ibid,	 pp.	 364–365).	 (They	 also	 claim	 that	 their	 account	 allows	 for	
mathematics	to	play	an	explanatory	role,	we	return	to	this	in	Section	6).		
	
Which	of	the	two	application	problems	introduced	in	Section	2	does	this	account	
address?	 Answers	 to	 the	 special	 problem	 are,	 by	 their	 very	 nature,	 contextual	
and	no	general	account	will,	on	its	own,	offer	a	solution	to	the	question	of	how	a	
																																																																																																																																																														
much	richer	than	the	simple	version	of	the	mapping	account	defined	above,	it	does	rely	crucially	
on	mappings	 to	 and	 from	 target	 systems	 and	mathematical	 structures,	 and	 in	 this	 sense	 is	 an	
advanced	version	of,	rather	than	an	alternative	to,	the	mapping	account.		
12	A	 related	point	 is	made	by	Weisberg	 (2013,	Section	3.3)	who	points	out	 that	 in	 cases	where	
mathematical	 structures	 are	 used	 to	 represent	 a	 physical	 system,	 an	 assignment	and	 intended	
scope	are	needed	to	specify	which	parts	of	the	structure	are	mapped	to	which	parts	of	the	target	
system.	Where	 the	structure	contains	parts	 that	don’t	 correspond	 to	any	purported	part	of	 the	
target	 system	(e.g.	where	 irrational	numbers	 satisfy	 the	Lotka-Volterra	equations)	 it	 should	be	
made	explicit	that	this	is	not	supposed	to	have	physical	import.		
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particular	 structure	 is	 applied	 (say,	 of	 how	 partial	 differential	 equations	 are	
applied	 to	 diffusion	 processes).	 The	 best	 a	 general	 account	 can	 do	 is	 offer	 a	
framework	for	the	analysis	of	specific	applications.	Bueno	and	Colyvan’s	account	
does	 exactly	 that.	 As	 they	 point	 out,	 the	 inherent	 flexibility	 and	 context	
sensitivity	of	their	framework	allows	them	to	account	for	Diarc’s	discovery	of	the	
positron;	why	we	 ignore	 negative	 solutions	 to	 quadratic	 equations	 in	 cases	 of	
predicating	 where	 a	 projectile	 will	 land;	 and	 the	 introduction	 of	 partial	
homomorphisms	 can,	 at	 least	 to	 some	 extent,	 accommodate	 cases	 like	 Simon’s	
account	of	bounded	rationality	where	the	mathematical	structures	captures	only	
some	of	the	relevant	features	of	the	target	system.		
	
However,	 despite	 offering	 a	 framework	 in	 which	 to	 think	 about	 specific	
applications	 of	 mathematics,	 no	 complete	 answer	 to	 the	 general	 problem	
emerges	from	Bueno	and	Colyvan’s	account.	The	general	problem	is	addressed	in	
the	 first	 and	 the	 third	 steps	when	mappings	between	 the	empirical	 set	up	and	
convenient	 mathematical	 structures	 are	 established:	 every	 application	 of	
mathematics	 involves	 setting	 up	 at	 least	 two	 relevant	 mappings.	 But	 target	
systems	are	physical	objects	–	atoms,	planets,	populations	of	rabbits,	economic	
agents,	and	so	on	–	and	not	structures.	Yet	a	mapping	 f 	is	a	relation	that	holds	
between	two	structures	and	claiming	that	a	set	theoretic	structure	is	morphic	to	
a	piece	of	the	physical	world	is	prima	facie	a	category	mistake.	If	we	are	to	make	
sense	of	the	claim	that	the	model	is	morphic	to	its	target	we	have	to	assume	that	
the	 target	 somehow	 exhibits	 a	 certain	 structure.	 Hence,	 formulated	 properly,	
applying	 structure	 SM requires	 defining	 a	 mapping	 f :ST → SM 	(and	 not	
f :T → SM )	 where	ST is	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 target.	 But	 what	 is	 the	 relation	
between	T 	and	 ST ?	 What	 does	 it	 mean	 for	 a	 target	 system	 –	 a	 part	 of	 the	
physical	world	–	to	possess	a	structure?	The	answer	to	this	question	is	far	from	
obvious	and	Bueno	and	Colyvan	are	aware	of	this	problem:	
	
“Put	 simply,	 the	 world	 does	 not	 come	 equipped	 with	 a	 set	 of	 objects	 (or	 nodes	 or	
positions)	and	sets	of	relations	on	those.	These	are	either	constructs	of	our	theories	of	
the	world	or	identified	by	our	theories	of	the	world.	Even	if	there	is	some	privileged	way	
of	carving	up	the	world	into	objects	and	relations	[…],	such	a	carving,	it	would	seem,	is	
delivered	 by	 our	 theories,	 not	 by	 the	 world	 itself.	 What	 we	 require	 for	 the	 mapping	
account	to	get	started	is	something	like	a	pre-theoretic	structure	of	the	world	(or	at	least	
a	 pre-modeling	 structure	 of	 the	 world).	 This	 is	 clearly	 a	 problem	 for	 the	 mapping	
account	 […]	 the	mapping	 account	 does	 require	 having	 what	 we	 shall	 call	 an	 assumed	
structure	 in	 order	 to	 get	 started.	 There	 is	 no	 avoiding	 such	 an	 assumption”	 (2011,	 p.	
347).	
Later	in	their	paper,	when	discussing	what	makes	their	account	more	attractive	
than	a	simple	mapping	account,	they	argue	that	their	account	has	the	means	to	
address	this	problem:	
“the	inferential	conception	is	well	placed	to	help	provide	the	crucial	assumed	structure.	
Recall	that	the	assumed	structure	is	the	structure	the	modeling	exercise	assumes	to	be	
present	in	the	world	[…]	we	will	need	to	impose	some	structure	on	the	world	in	order	to	
begin	the	modeling	exercise.	Earlier	we	suggested	that	the	mapping	account	might	treat	
this	 initial	 assumed	 structure	 as	 defeasible	 and	 let	 the	 resulting	 mathematical	 model	
help	 inform	 refinements	 or	 revisions	 to	 the	 initial	 assumed	 structure.	 The	 inferential	
account	 has	 the	 resources	 to	make	 revisions	midstream	and	does	 not	 require	 starting	
from	scratch	each	time	a	more	fruitful	assumed	structure	is	conceived.	This	is	achieved	
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by	employing	the	composite	mappings	to	move	from	the	mathematized	initial	assumed	
structure	 to	 another	 mathematical	 structure,	 where	 the	 latter	 may	 be	 thought	 to	
correspond	 to	 a	new	 (revised)	 assumed	 structure.	There	 is	no	need	 to	 revise	 formally	
the	initial	assumed	structure	because	the	interpretation	step	of	the	process	will	deliver	
the	final	structure	of	the	empirical	set	up—one	informed	by	the	modeling	exercise	and	
one	that	may	well	be	quite	different	from	the	initial	assumed	structure”	(2011,	p.	357).	
Bueno	and	Colyvan	are	right	 in	pointing	out	that	their	account	offers	 increased	
flexibility,	 but	 this	 does	 not	 explain	 how	 a	 structure	 emerges	 from	 something	
non-structural	in	the	first	place.	To	revise	a	structure	presupposes	that	there	is	a	
structure	to	begin	with,	but	Bueno	and	Colyvan	have	little	to	say	about	where	the	
“assumed	 structure”	 comes	 from.	Likewise,	 Pincock	 signals	 awareness	of	 there	
being	 “an	 important	difference	between	 talking	 about	 a	 concrete	 system	made	
up	of	objects	and	linked	together	by	concrete	relations	involving	quantities	and	
properties	and	a	set-theoretic	structure”	(2012,	p.29),	but	then	says	little	about	
how	 this	 gap	 is	 to	 be	 bridged.	 Hence,	 that	 there	 is	 a	 structure	 to	 begin	 with	
remains	an	unanalysed	posit,	and	with	it	the	general	application	problem	is	left	
unresolved.		
	
	
4.	The	Curse	of	Abundance	
	
In	order	to	make	sense	of	the	mapping	account,	an	account	needs	to	be	given	of	
where	 the	 structure	 of	 a	 target	 system	 comes	 from.	 In	 this	 section	we	 review	
existing	accounts	and	argue	that	they	are	dead	ends.		
	
A	first	suggestion	is	that	data	models	are	the	sought-after	“assumed	structure”	of	
the	 target	 system.	Mathematics	 is	 not	 applied	 to	 a	mysterious	 structure	 of	 the	
system	itself,	but	to	a	data	model	that	results	from	performing	measurements	on	
the	system.	The	 idea	 that	data	might	provide	 the	required	target-end	structure	
originated	 in	 a	 different	 context,	 namely	 the	 issue	 of	 representation	 in	 the	 so-
called	 semantic	 view	 of	 theories.	 The	 idea	 is	 originally	 found	 in	 Suppes’	
(1962/1969),	 but	 has	 been	 most	 developed	 by	 van	 Fraassen	 (2008). 13	
Experimental	measuring	processes	gather	raw	data.	These	are	then	cleaned,	with	
anomalous	data	points	rejected	and	measurement	error	taken	into	account.	Then	
they	are	often	idealized,	for	instance	by	replacing	discrete	points	by	a	continuous	
curve.	Where	these	data	points	are	numeric,	the	smooth	curve	is	a	function	that	
can	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 relation	 defined	 over	ℝ,	 or	ℝn,	 or	 intervals	 thereof.	 These	
data	models	 are	 set	 theoretic	 structures,	 and	 therefore	 they	 can	enter	 into	 the	
morphisms	as	required	by	the	mapping	account.			
	
The	main	problem	 facing	 this	 idea	 is	 that	 if	 this	 is	 the	 end	of	 the	 story	 then	 it	
turns	out	that	mathematics	doesn’t	apply	to	the	physical	world	after	all	because	
data	 themselves	are	mathematical	objects	–	 in	 fact	 this	 is	what	allows	 them	 to	
play	the	required	role	of	the	“assumed	structure”	in	the	mapping	account.	So	the	
account	 ends	 up	 applying	 mathematics	 to	 mathematics,	 and	 hence	 begs	 the	
question	of	how	mathematics	is	applied	to	the	world.	In	the	context	of	scientific	
																																																								
13		For	a	critical	discussion	(that	pre-dates	van	Fraassen’s	2008	development)	see	Brading	and	
Landry’s	(2006).	
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representation	 van	 Fraassen	 (2008)	 responds	 to	 this	 objection	 by	 invoking	
pragmatic	aspects	of	the	context	of	using	scientific	models.	In	the	language	of	the	
mapping	 account,	 the	 core	 of	 van	 Fraassen’s	 argument	 is	 that	 there	 is	 no	
pragmatic	 difference	 between	 taking	 a	 mathematical	 structure	 to	 apply	
accurately	 to	 a	physical	 system	and	accurately	 apply	 to	data	 extracted	 from	 it.	
Nguyen	(2016)	provides	a	critical	discussion	of	van	Fraassen’s	argument	in	the	
context	 of	 theory	 of	 representation	 and	 concludes	 that	 the	 argument	 is	
unsuccessful	in	deflating	the	gap	between	data	and	physical	systems.	Nothing	in	
Nguyen’s	argument	depends	on	whether	the	problem	at	hand	is	representation	
or	the	applicability	of	mathematics,	and	hence	the	argument	carries	over	mutatis	
mutandis.	But	in	the	absence	of	a	successful	argument	deflating	the	gap	between	
data	extracted	from	a	system	and	the	system	itself,	appealing	to	data	to	provide	
the	 structure	 of	 a	 physical	 systems	 delivers	 an	 account	 of	 the	 applicability	 of	
mathematics	whereby	mathematics	applies	to	other	parts	of	mathematics,	rather	
than	the	physical	world	proper.		
	
The	 second	 suggestion	 of	where	 to	 find	 the	 “assumed	 structure”	 of	 a	 physical	
system	is	more	radical.	One	could	simply	claim	that	physical	systems	themselves	
are	structures.	Prime	facie	this	seems	like	a	category	mistake:	structures	are	sets	
with	 relations	 and	 functions	 existentially	 defined	 upon	 them,	 and	 physical	
systems	 are	 not	 sets.	 However	 Tegmark	 (2008)	 argues	 the	 contrary.	 His	
argument	 proceeds	 from	 what	 looks	 like	 an	 innocuous	 claim:	 there	 exists	 an	
external	physical	reality	completely	independent	of	us	humans	(what	he	calls	the	
“external	 reality	 hypothesis”).	 He	 argues	 that	 this	 entails	 that	 the	 world	 is	 a	
mathematical	structure	(his	“mathematical	universe	hypothesis”).	His	argument	
for	 this	 is	 based	 on	 the	 notion	 that	 a	 so	 called	 “theory-of-everything”	must	 be	
expressible	in	a	form	that	is	devoid	of	human-centric	“baggage”	(by	the	external	
reality	 hypothesis),	 and	 the	 only	 theories	 that	 are	 devoid	 of	 such	 baggage	 are	
mathematical,	which,	 strictly	speaking,	describe	mathematical	 structures.	Thus,	
since	a	complete	theory	of	everything	describes	an	external	reality	independent	
of	humans,	and	since	 it	describes	a	mathematical	structure,	 the	external	reality	
itself	is	a	mathematical	structure.		
	
This	 approach	 stands	 or	 falls	 on	 the	 strengths	 of	 its	 premise	 that	 a	 complete	
theory	 of	 everything	 will	 be	 formulated	 purely	 mathematically,	 without	 any	
human	baggage,	which	in	turn	relies	on	a	strict	reductionist	account	of	scientific	
knowledge.	 We	 have	 doubts	 about	 a	 number	 of	 steps	 in	 this	 argument,	 in	
particular	 the	 validity	 of	 inference	 from	 the	 proposition	 that	 a	 theory	 of	
everything	 describes	 a	 mathematical	 structure	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	
external	 reality	 itself	 is	 a	 mathematical	 structure.	 However,	 an	 in-depth	
assessment	 of	 Tegmark’s	 argument	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 paper.	 For	 our	
current	purposes	is	sufficient	to	note	that	Tegmark’s	discussion	is	focused	on	the	
claim	that	fundamentally	the	world	is	a	mathematical	structure.	Even	if	this	is	the	
case,	the	argument	fails	to	illuminate	any	case	where	mathematics	is	applied	to	a	
target	 system	 at	 the	 non-fundamental	 level.	 Arithmetic	 can	 be	 used	 to	 count	
objects	 on	 the	 desk;	 a	 biologist	 might	 use	 the	 Lotka-Volterra	 equations	 to	
generate	a	prediction	about	a	predator-prey	system;	an	economist	might	use	a	
pair	 of	 utility	 and	 probability	 functions	 that	 map	 to	 the	 real	 numbers	 to	
summarise	 someone’s	 choice	 behaviour;	 and	 so	 on.	 It	 is	 undeniable	 that	 these	
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are	 instances	 of	 applying	 mathematics.	 Yet	 these	 target	 systems	 are	 not	 a	
fundamental	 part	 of	 the	 world,	 nor	 do	 models	 of	 these	 objects	 have	 to	 make	
reference	 to	 their	 fundamental	constituents.	When	modelling	an	airplane	wing,	
aeronautic	engineers	don’t	 first	 identify	 the	fundamental	super-string	structure	
of	the	bits	of	matter	that	make	up	the	wing	and	then	construct	wing	models	that	
are	isomorphic	to	such	fundamental	structures.	So	even	if	Tegmark’s	account	is	
correct	about	the	fundamental	level	(and	there	is	serious	“if”	about	this),	it	offers	
no	answer	to	the	question	about	where	structures	are	to	be	found	at	the	level	of	
non-fundamental	target	systems.	
	
If	data	don’t	provide	a	suitable	proxy	for	the	structure	of	a	target	system,	and	a	
target	 system	 shouldn’t	 be	 identified	with	 such	 a	 structure,	 then	 what	 other	
options	are	available?	We	take	it	that	the	idea	that	either	implicitly	or	explicitly	
underlies	 the	 mapping	 account	 is	 that	 target	 systems	 instantiate	 structures,	
where	 the	 instantiation	 relation	 that	 holds	 between	 a	 target	 system	 and	 a	
structure	is	supposed	to	be	the	sort	of	relation	that	holds	between	an	object	and	
a	property,	or	a	pair	of	objects	and	a	relation	they	enter	into.	This	comes	across	
most	 clearly	when	 structuralists	 in	 the	 philosophy	 of	mathematics	 discuss	 the	
relationship	between	mathematics	and	the	physical	world.	For	example,	Shapiro	
argues	that:	
	
“[On	 the	 structuralist	 account	of	mathematics]	 the	problem	of	 the	 relationship	
between	 mathematics	 and	 reality	 is	 a	 special	 case	 of	 the	 problem	 of	 the	
instantiation	 of	 universals.	 Mathematics	 is	 to	 reality	 as	 universal	 is	 to	
instantiated	 particular.	 As	 above,	 the	 ‘universal’	 here	 refers	 to	 a	 pattern	 or	
structure;	 the	 ‘particular’	 refers	 not	 to	 an	 individual	 object,	 but	 to	 a	 system	of	
related	objects.	More	specifically,	then,	mathematics	is	to	reality	as	pattern	is	to	
patterned”	(1983,	p.	538).14	
	
Let	 us	 then	 assume	 that	 a	 structure	S 	defines	 a	 universal.	 The	main	 question	
then	 is:	 under	what	 conditions	 does	 a	 target	 instantiate	 a	 certain	 structure	S ?	
The	details	here	might	depend	on	which	account	of	universals	one	adopts,	but	
what	 all	 answers	 would	 seem	 to	 have	 in	 common	 is	 the	 following.	 Since	 a	
structure	 consists	 of	 a	 set	 of	 objects	 with	 relations	 on	 them,	 the	 target	T
instantiates	structure	ST 	iff	T consists	of	individuals	that	make	up	the	domain	of	
ST 	and	enter	into	the	relations	that	are	specified	in	 R .		
	
Natural	 as	 this	 may	 sound,	 this	 definition	 faces	 an	 immediate	 problem.	 The	
problem	is	Newman’s	objection	to	Russell’s	structural	realism	(Newman	1928).	
The	essential	point	of	the	objection	is	that	for	any	structure	S = U,R 	where	the	
cardinality	 of	U 	is	 k ,	 a	 target	 system	 consisting	 of	 k 	objects	 instantiates	 a	
																																																								
14	A	similar	position	is	found	in	Resnik’s	(1997,	p.	204).	Due	to	the	fact	that	some	mathematical	
structures	 are	 not	 instantiated	 by	 any	 physical	 system,	 Shapiro	 further	 distinguishes	 between	
whether	 or	 not	 structures	 as	 universals	 should	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 ante	 rem	 universals,	 in	 re	
universals	(eliminative	structuralism)	or	in	modal	terms	(Shapiro	1997).	These	distinctions	are	
immaterial	to	our	question.	A	word	of	warning	about	terminology	is	in	order	here.	Shapiro	often	
uses	 the	 term	 “exemplified”	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	 a	 universal	 and	 a	 physical	
system.	We	prefer	 “instantiates”	 given	 that	 that	 “exemplification”	 is	used	 in	 a	 slightly	different	
way	in	the	literature	of	representation	following	Goodman	and	Elgin,	and	has	been	incorporated	
into	the	literature	on	scientific	representation	in	our	(forthcoming).	
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structure	isomorphic	to	S 	in	the	sense	that	it	is	possible	to	extensionally	define	
relations	matching	 the	 relations	 in	 R 	in	 terms	of	n-tuples	 of	 the	 objects	 in	 the	
target	 system.15	So	 if	we	 think	about	 instantiation	 in	 this	way,	 then	we	are	 left	
with	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 target	 system	 instantiates	 any	 structure	 that	 has	 the	
cardinality	of	the	target.		
	
We	 are	 now	 faced	with	 an	 identification	 problem.	 Recall	 Bueno	 and	 Colyvan’s	
first	 step,	 immersion,	 which	 consists	 in	 “establishing	 a	 mapping	 from	 the	
empirical	set	up	to	a	convenient	mathematical	structure”	(op	cit.).	To	establish	a	
mapping	 it	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 show	 that	 there	 exists	 some	 structure	 ST in	 the	
target	such	that	there	exists	some	mapping	 f 	from	ST to	SM .	Applying	a	certain	
structure	SM requires,	as	Bueno	and	Colyvan	aptly	put	it,	establishing	a	mapping.	
This,	 in	 turn,	 involves	 identifying	 a	 particular	 structure	 ST in	 the	 target	 and	
constructing	 a	mapping	 f 	from	that	structure	 to	SM ,	 the	structure	 that	 is	 to	be	
applied.	 Or	 to	 put	 it	 another	 way,	 applying	SM is	 an	 agent-based	 notion	 –	 it’s	
something	that	a	scientist	does	(which	ties	in	with	Bueno	and	Colyvan’s	emphasis	
on	 pragmatic	 factors).	 To	 apply	 a	 structure	SM 	to	 a	 target	 the	 scientist	 has	 to	
single	out	a	particular	target	structure	and	explicitly	construct	the	mapping	 f 	by	
matching	up	elements	in	the	domains	of	the	structures	and	pairing	up	relations.	
If	 there	 was	 only	 one	 structure	 in	 target	 –	 if	 there	 was	 such	 a	 thing	 as	 “the”	
structure	of	 the	 target	–	 then	 there	was	no	question	 about	 this	 choice	 and	 the	
remaining	 issue	 would	 only	 be	 how	 exactly	 the	 scientist	 gains	 access	 to	 that	
structure.	But	faced	with	the	Newmanian	abundance	of	structures,	the	scientist	
wanting	 to	 apply	 maths	 is	 faced	 with	 serious	 underdetermination	 problem:	
which	of	the	many	structures	should	she	pick	and	how?		
	
One	might	argue	that	Newman’s	objection	is	just	logical	trickery	and	once	a	few	
sensible	 assumptions	 about	 the	 system	 are	 made	 the	 underdetermination	 is	
resolved.	 This	 is	 in	 effect	 the	 route	 taken	 by	 the	 standard	 ways	 of	 blocking	
Newman’s	 objection,	 which	 involve	 appeal	 to	 natural	 kinds	 in	 one	 way	 or	
other.16	One	 may	 have	 all	 kind	 of	 quibbles	 about	 natural	 kinds,	 but	 let	 us	 set	
these	 aside	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 argument.	 It	 is	 our	 contention	 that	 even	 if	 natural	
kinds	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 unproblematic,	 an	 appeal	 to	 them	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	
resolve	 the	 remaining	 underdetermination	 issues.	 Let	 us	 illustrate	 this	 point	
with	 an	 example,	 the	 methane	 molecule.17	The	 molecule	 consists	 of	 a	 carbon	
atom	 and	 four	 hydrogen	 atoms	 grouped	 around	 it,	 forming	 a	 tetrahedron.	
Between	 each	 hydrogen	 atom	 and	 the	 carbon	 atom	 there	 is	 a	 covalent	 bond.	
																																																								
15	For	 a	 detailed	 discussion	 of	 the	 theorem	 see	 Ketland’s	 (2004).	 However,	 the	 basic	 point	 is	
straightforward	 and	 can	 shown	 as	 follows.	 Let	 〈U , R〉 	be	 a	 structure	 such	 that	 |U |= k .	 Let	
 T ={x1,...,xk} 	be	a	set	consisting	of	the	 k 	objects	from	the	target	system.	Since	 |T |=|U |= k 	
there	is	a	bijection	 f :T →U .	Using	this	bijection,	for	each	 ri ∈R ,	we	can	construct	a	set	 r 'i 	
consisting	 of	 n-tuples	 of	 objects	 from	  T 	as	 follows:	  
{〈xi ,...,x j 〉 : 〈 f (xi ),..., f (x j )〉 ∈ri}. 	
Collecting	these	relations	together	gives	a	structure,	 〈T , R '〉 	which	 is	 isomorphic	 to	 〈U , R〉 	by	
construction.	
16	For	a	discussion	of	the	various	responses	see	Ainsworth’s	(2009).	
17	What	follows	is	a	variation	on	an	example	discussed	in	Frigg’s	(2006,	pp.57-58).	
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Carbon,	hydrogen	and	covalent	bonds	are	bona	fide	natural	kinds.	Describing	the	
molecule	 in	 these	 terms	 does,	 however,	 not	 fix	 a	 structure	 uniquely.	 	 One	 can	
regard	 the	 atoms	 as	 objects	 and	 the	 bonds	 are	 relations.	 Denoting	 the	 carbon	
atom	by	a,	and	the	four	hydrogen	atoms	by	b,	c,	d,	and	e,	we	obtain	a	structure	ST	
with	 the	 domain	 { , , , , }U a b c d e= 	and	 the	 relation	 r ={< a,b >,  < b,a >,  < a,c >,
 < c,a >,  < a,d >,  < d ,a >,  < a,e >,  < e,a >} ,	 which	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 ‘being	
connected	 by	 a	 covalent	 bond’.	 Alternatively,	 however,	 one	 could	 just	 as	 well	
choose	bonds	as	objects	and	consider	the	relation	‘sharing	a	node	with	another	
bond’.	Denoting	the	bonds	by	 ', ', 'a b c and	 'd ,	we	obtain	a	structure	 S 'T 	with	the	
domain	  U ' ={a ',b ',c ',d '} 	and	 the	 relation	  r ' ={< a ',b ' >,  < b ',a ' >,  < a ',c ' >,
 < c ',a ' >,  < a ',d ' >,  < d ',a ' >, 	  < b ',c ' >, 	  < c ',b ' >, 	  < b ',d ' >,  < d ',b ' >,  < c ',d ' >,
 < d ',c ' >} .	 	 Obviously	 ST 	and	 S 'T 	are	 not	 isomorphic.	 So	 which	 structure	 is	
picked	out	depends	on	how	the	system	is	described.	Depending	on	which	parts	
one	 regards	 as	 individuals	 and	 what	 relation	 one	 chooses,	 very	 different	
structures	 can	 emerge.	 And	 it	 takes	 little	 ingenuity	 to	 come	 up	 with	 further	
descriptions	of	the	methane	molecule,	which	lead	to	yet	other	structures.		
	
There	is	nothing	special	about	the	methane	molecule,	and	similar	stories	can	be	
told	about	any	target.	Consider	again	the	example	of	applying	mathematics	to	the	
rabbit	population	mentioned	in	Section	2.	When	faced	with	the	population	there	
are	 any	 number	 of	ways	 in	which	 the	 system	 considered	 as	 a	whole	 could	 be	
carved	 up.	 Regarding	 the	 objects	 in	 the	 system	 the	 scientist	 could	 count	
individual	 rabbits	 as	 above.	 Or	 she	 could	 take	 pairs	 of	 rabbits	 as	 the	 relevant	
objects.	Or	she	could	count	rabbit	legs	(perhaps	she	is	interested	in	selling	them	
as	 lucky	charms).	Or	she	could	count	rabbit	hairs,	or	rabbit	 teeth.	Or	she	could	
take	 individual	 molecules	 in	 the	 system	 to	 form	 the	 basic	 objects	 and	 define	
elaborate	structures	on	a	massive	set	containing	them.	For	any	target	system	the	
question	of	what	to	take	as	the	objects	and	the	relations	is	a	substantive	question	
inviting	 multiple	 answers.18		 And	 even	 once	 the	 objects	 are	 fixed,	 there	 is	 no	
unique	 answer	 as	 to	 what	 relations	 between	 them	 should	 be	 considered.	 The	
scientist	could	care	about	the	reproduction	behaviour	of	the	rabbits,	or	different	
ways	of	grouping	them	according	to	their	fur,	or	grouping	them	according	to	the	
length	of	their	ears,	and	so	on.	So	the	lesson	learned	generalises:	there	is	no	such	
thing	 as	 “the”	 structure	 of	 a	 target	 system.	 There	 are	 any	 number	 of	 ways	 of	
picking	out	a	set	of	objects	to	form	the	domain	of	a	structure	of	the	target	system.	
And	 even	 once	 this	 is	 done,	 any	 number	 of	 different	 physical	 properties	 and	
relations	 that	might	be	of	 interest	would	deliver	a	different	 structure	 to	which	
the	mathematical	structure	would	be	applied	via	a	proposed	morphism.	
	
In	their	description	of	the	“immersion”	step	Bueno	and	Colyvan	identify	theories	
as	the	actors	that	provide	a	structure.	They	say	that	the	elements	of	a	structure	
																																																								
18	Weisberg	 (2013,	 Section	 5.3.1)	makes	 a	 similar	 point	when	 he	 draws	 a	 distinction	 between	
phenomena	and	 target	 systems.	 He	 claims	 that	 the	 former	 stand	 in	 a	 one-to-many	 relationship	
with	the	latter,	where	a	model’s	“intended	scope”	specifies	a	(proper)	subset	(target	system)	of	
the	total	state	of	the	system	(phenomena).	Having	said	that,	our	point	here	goes	beyond	his:	even	
once	a	target	system	of	interest	is	fixed,	there	still	remains	the	question	concerning	its	structure	
(cf.	the	example	of	the	methane	molecule	which	would	seem	to	count	as	a	target	system	on	any	
reasonable	reading	of	the	term).		
	 13	
are	“constructs	of	our	 theories”,	which	deliver	“some	privileged	way	of	carving	
up	the	world	into	objects	and	relations”	(op.	cit).	This	suggestion,	however,	runs	
into	 the	 same	 difficulties	 as	 natural	 kinds.	 While	 theories	 may	 play	 a	 role	 in	
identifying	 a	 structure,	 they	 do	 not	 determine	 a	 unique	 structure.	 Newtonian	
mechanics,	for	instance,	instructs	us	to	identify	objects	and	the	forces	acting	on	
them,	 but	 it	 doesn’t	 prescribe	 how	 exactly	 this	 has	 to	 be	 done.	 Just	 like	 a	
population	of	rabbits,	a	galaxy	of	stellar	bodies	can	be	carved	up	into	objects	and	
relations	in	many	different	ways.		
	
So	we	 are	 still	 faced	with	 the	 above	 identification	 problem.	 If	 the	 relationship	
between	 target	 systems	 and	 their	 structures	 is	 not	 one	 of	 brute	metaphysical	
fact,	and	if	the	same	target	system	has	multiple	structures,	then	when	someone	
proposes	 a	 structure-preserving	 mapping	 between	 a	 target	 structure	 and	 a	
mathematical	 structure,	 how	 are	 we	 to	 determine	 which	 of	 those	 target	
structures	are	being	 invoked?	Without	an	answer	 to	 this	question	 it’s	not	clear	
either	that	 the	 invoked	structure	preserving	mapping	 is	well	defined,	or	 if	 it	 is,	
then	whether	or	not	the	application	of	mathematics	is	successful.		
	
From	this	we	don’t	conclude	that	Bueno	and	Colyvan’s	account	is	wrong,	but	that	
it	 is	 incomplete.	 “Immersion”	 is	 a	metaphor	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 unpacked.	 Their	
presentation	seems	to	suggest	that	once	a	theoretical	background	is	assumed	a	
relevant	 structure	 emerges	 in	 a	 relatively	 unproblematic	 manner,	 and	 those	
interested	in	the	applicability	of	mathematics	can	take	this	structure	for	granted	
without	probing	further	into	its	nature	and	origins.19		The	considerations	in	this	
section	 show	 that	 there	 is	more	 to	 the	 problem	of	 the	 attribution	 of	 structure	
than	 meets	 the	 eye	 at	 first	 glance.	 There	 is	 a	 serious	 issue	 where	 the	 initial	
structure	 ST comes	 from,	 and	 the	 issue	 is	 not	 merely	 one	 of	 philosophical	
housekeeping.	Without	further	explanations,	we	neither	know	what	ST is,	nor	are	
we	able	to	specify	the	proposed	morphism	that	anchors	the	application	of	 SM .	
	
		
5.	A	Positive	Proposal	
	
In	this	section	we	introduce	what	we	call	 the	extensional	abstraction	account	of	
generating	 a	 target	 structure.	 In	 essence,	 we	 propose	 that	 for	 the	 mapping	
account	 to	 get	 off	 the	 ground,	 a	 scientist	 has	 to	 describe	 the	 target	 system	 in	
physical	 terms,	 and	 then	 by	 abstracting	 away	 to	 the	 extension	 of	 such	 a	
description,	generate	a	target	structure	to	anchor	an	application	of	mathematics.		
	
The	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 we	 have	 been	 addressing	 follows	 from	 a	 careful	
analysis	 of	 the	 above	 cases.	 Recall	 the	 scenario	 that	 the	 scientist	 is	 faced	with	
when	 applying	mathematics	 to	 a	 population	 of	 rabbits.	We	described	different	
ways	she	might	do	this,	ways	that	involved	selecting	different	parts	of	the	system	
as	objects	and	identifying	different	physical	properties	and	relations	as	relevant	
depending	 on	 her	 purpose	 at	 hand.	 In	 doing	 so	 she	 provided	 what	 we	 call	
																																																								
19See	Bueno	and	Colyvan’s	(2011,	p.	347)	quoted	above.	As	discussed,	Bueno	and	Colyvan	allow	
for	 revisions	 of	 the	 “assumed	 structure”	 downstream.	But	 our	 concern	 is	 prior:	where	 did	 the	
original	structure	come	from	in	the	first	place?	
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different	structure	generating	descriptions	of	the	same	system	in	each	instance.	In	
general	a	structure	generating	description	does	three	things:	
	
(1) It	describes	 certain	aspects	of	 the	 system	as	 the	 relevant	objects.	 In	 the	
above	example	different	descriptions	described	individual	rabbits,	rabbit	
legs,	or	molecules	that	make	up	the	rabbits	as	the	relevant	objects	of	the	
system.	
(2) It	describes	certain	aspects	of	the	system	as	relevant	physical	properties	
and	 relations.	 In	 the	 above	 examples	 these	were	 physical	 relations	 that	
held	between	 interbreeding	 rabbits,	descriptions	of	 the	 rabbits’	 fur,	 and	
so	on.	
(3) It	 describes	 the	 objects	 described	 in	 (1)	 as	 instantiating	 the	 physical	
properties	and	relations	described	in	(2).	
	
In	general	a	structure	generating	description	Ds	has	the	form:	“the	target	system	
T	contains	objects	o1,	…,	on	which	either	individually,	or	in	collections,	instantiate	
physical	 properties	 and	 relations	 r1,	 …,	 rm.”	 It’s	 important	 to	 note	 that	 Ds	
contains	terms	that	describe	the	system	in	physical,	not	set-theoretic	terms,	and	
we	use	bold	font	to	indicate	that	the	terms	in	Ds	refer	to	physical	properties	and	
relations.	The	os	are	terms	 like	“rabbit”	and	“rabbit	 leg”	and	not	“elements	of	a	
set”.	 Likewise,	 the	rs	 are	 terms	 like	 “breeding	with”	or	 “being	 larger	 than”	 and	
not	“being	an	n-tuple”.		
	
With	this	in	mind	it	now	transpires	how	a	structure	generating	description	earns	
its	name	and	actually	generates	a	structure	for	a	target	system	for	the	mapping	
account	 to	 get	 a	 grip	 on.	 Recall	 from	 Section	 3	 that	 a	 set-theoretic	 structure	
consists	 of	 featureless	 dummy-objects	 that	 enter	 into	 purely	 extensionally	
defined	relations.	Ds	generates	such	a	structure	if	we	remove	the	physical	nature	
of	the	objects	and	relations	from	Ds.	In	the	case	of	the	os	this	means	that	we	move	
from	describing	the	system	as	consisting	of	rabbits	to	describing	it	as	consisting	
of	 objects.	 If	Ds	 talks	of,	 say,	 five	 rabbits	 (and	pinpoints	 them	by	picking	out	 a	
particular	 rabbit	 as	 the	 first	 rabbit,	 another	one	as	 the	 second	 rabbit,	 etc.),	we	
now	 remove	 “rabbits”	 from	 this	 description	 and	 only	 keep	 “objects”	 (and,	
possibly,	 a	 numbering	 of	 them	 as	 the	 first	 object,	 the	 second	 object,	 etc.).	 The	
relations	 get	 stripped	 of	 their	 physical	 nature	 by	 replacing	 them	 with	 their	
extension.	 If	 Ds	 describes	 the	 relation	 as	 “breeding	 with”,	 we	 now	 remove	
“breeding	with”	and	only	keep	the	extension	of	the	relation,	which	only	specifies	
between	which	objects	the	relation	holds	but	not	what	the	relation	itself	 is.	We	
call	the	resulting	description	Ds	(now	no	longer	in	bold	font).	While	Ds	describes	
T	as	consisting	of	interbreeding	rabbits,	Ds	describes	it	as	consisting	of	so-and-so	
many	objects	that	enter	into	purely	extensionally	defined	relations.	Ds	is	a	purely	
structural	 description,	 which	 specifies	 a	 structure	 ST	 consisting	 of	 n	 dummy-
objects	o1,	…,	on	which	enter	into	purely	extensionally	defined	relations	r1,	…,	rm	
(note	that	symbols	are	now	no	longer	in	bold	font).	This	structure	is	what	enters	
into	the	mapping	relation	required	by	the	mapping	account.	
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The	transition	from	Ds	to	Ds	can	be	described	as	a	process	of	abstraction,	hence	
the	name	“extensional	abstraction	account”.20	We	start	with	a	“thick”	description	
Ds	of	the	target	and	then,	by	walking	up	the	ladder	of	abstraction,	strip	away	all	
material	properties	of	 the	object	until	we	are	 left	with	objects	 that	are	nothing	
but	 objects,	 and	 relations	 that	 are	 nothing	 but	n-tuples	 of	 nothing-but-objects.	
But	 unlike	 Wittgensteinian	 ladders,	 which	 can	 be	 thrown	 away	 once	 we’ve	
reached	the	top,	abstraction	ladders	have	to	remain	in	place.	First,	Ds	specifies	to	
what	 the	 structure	 is	 applied.	 The	 description	 Ds	 anchors	 the	 application	 of	
structure	ST	to	the	target,	and	without	Ds	the	application	has	been	lost	because	if	
we	remove	Ds	from	the	picture	we	are	left	with	nothing	but	an	abstract	structure.	
Second,	 Bueno	 and	 Colyvan’s	 third	 step	 requires	 us	 to	 “interpret	 the	
mathematical	consequences	that	were	obtained	in	the	derivation	step	in	terms	of	
the	 initial	 empirical	 set	 up”	 (op.	 cit).	 This	 is	 impossible	without	Ds	(or	 at	 least	
some	description	of	the	target	system	in	physical	terms).	If	we	throw	the	ladder	
away,	we	cannot	climb	down	any	more	and	bring	mathematical	results	back	to	
the	 domain	 of	 application.	 For	 these	 reasons	 a	 structure	ST	 applies	 to	 target	T	
always	only	relative	to	a	structure	generating	description	Ds,	and	the	phrase	of	
“applying	S	to	T”	should	be	seen	as	an	ellipse	for	“applying	S	to	T	relative	to	the	
structure	 generating	 description	 Ds”.	 Without	 Ds	 the	 claim	 that	 a	 structure	 S	
applies	to	T	is	meaningless.	For	this	reason	mathematics	is	not	the	only	language	
in	the	book	of	nature!	
	
One	 might	 ask	 when	 in	 the	 process	 we	 have	 outlined	 we	 enter	 the	 realm	 of	
mathematics:	 is	 it	when	we	transition	 from	Ds	 to	Ds	 (and	with	 it	 to	ST	),	or	 is	 it	
when	 ST	 	 is	 connected	 to	SM	 through	 a	 suitable	morphism?	 The	 answer	 to	 this	
question	 depends	 on	how	 strictly	 one	 characterises	 “mathematics”,	 and	where	
one	puts	the	emphasis.	If	one	takes	any	use	of	set	theory	to	be	mathematics,	then	
the	application	happens	in	the	transition	from	Ds,	via	Ds,,	to	ST.	This	seems	to	be	
suggested,	 for	 example,	 by	Malament	 (1982,	 pp.	 529-532)	 in	 his	 discussion	 of	
whether	 Field	 (1980)	 is	 entitled	 to	 use	 sets	 of	 spacetime	 points	 in	 his	
“nominalist”	 reconstruction	 of	 Newtonian	 gravity.	 Under	 a	 stricter	 reading	 of	
“mathematics”,	where	one	asks	at	what	point	the	sorts	of	structures	studied	by	
mathematicians	(e.g.	those	that	appear	in	differential	geometry	or	linear	algebra)	
enter	 the	 picture,	 application	 happens	when	 one	 proposes	 to	 connect	ST	 to	 SM	
through	a	suitable	morphism.	We	think	that	this	is	the	sense	of	“application”	that	
most	proponents	of	the	mapping	account	have	in	mind.	We	take	it	as	an	attribute	
of	our	approach	that	it	can	distinguish	between	these	subtlety	different	senses	of	
the	 application	 of	 mathematics.	 Ultimately	 both	 senses	 are	 legitimate	 and	 a	
choice	 between	 them	 depends	 on	 one’s	 interest	 and	 other	 philosophical	
commitments.		
		
So	 our	 answer	 to	 the	 general	 application	 problem	 is	 the	 following.	 A	
mathematical	 structure	 SM	 applies	 to	 a	 target	 T	 iff	 a	 structure	 generating	
description	Ds	of	T	is	given	which,	through	a	process	of	abstraction,	is	turned	into	
a	purely	 extensional	description	Ds	 that	describes	a	 structure	ST,	which	 is	 then	
proposed	to	be	appropriately	morphic	to	SM.	With	this	in	place,	the	details	of	the	
																																																								
20	Abstraction	can	be	explicated	a	number	of	different	ways.	One	way	that	we	find	conducive	 is	
Cartwright’s	(1999,	Ch.	3),	but	nothing	in	what	follows	depends	on	what	account	of	abstraction	
one	adopts.		
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morphism	 between	 SM	 and	 ST	 	 (and	 possibly	 further	 mathematical	 structures)	
can	be	spelled	out	on	a	case-by-case	basis	by	 the	mapping	account’s	answer	 to	
the	special	applicability	problem.	As	such,	once	Ds	has	done	its	job	and	generated	
ST,	 all	 of	 the	 flexibility	 of,	 for	 instance,	 Bueno	 and	 Colyvan’s	 more	 nuanced	
mapping	account,	which	takes	into	account	contextual	features	in	specifying	the	
appropriate	morphism,	can	be	accommodated.21		
	
Our	account,	even	though	schooled	on	a	simple	population	model,	 is	 in	no	way	
limited	 to	 this	 kind	 of	 application.	 An	 important	 place	 where	 mathematics	 is	
applied	 to	 the	 physical	 world	 is	 in	 fundamental	 measurement,	 and	 on	 closer	
inspection	 it	 turns	 out	 that	 representation	 theorems	 in	 the	 representational	
theory	 of	 measurement	 are	 a	 good	 place	 to	 see	 our	 approach	 in	 action.22	
Consider	a	simple	example	where	the	system	in	question	is	a	collection	of	rods.	
The	scientist	can	describe	the	system	in	a	way	that	takes	the	individual	rods	to	
be	 the	objects	 in	 the	system,	and	a	 length	comparison	between	 them	to	be	 the	
relevant	 physical	 relation.	 This	 way	 of	 looking	 at	 the	 system	 provides	 the	
following	structure	generating	description:	
	
Dl:	 “The	 target	 system	 consists	 of	 n	 rods	 o1,	 …,	 on.	 The	 rods	 enter	 into	 the	
comparative	physical	relation	r	=	longer	or	equal	in	length	than.	It	is	the	case	that	
the	rods	have	been	labelled	so	any	two	consecutive	rods	stand	in	relation	r:	r(o2,	
o1),	r(o3,	o2),	...,	r(on,	on-1).	It	is	also	the	case	that	if	r(om,	om-1),	then	r(om,	ok)	for	all	
k=1,	…,	m-1	and	for	all	m=2,	…,	n.”23	
	
This	 description	 is	 now	 subjected	 to	 the	 above	 process	 of	 abstraction,	 which	
yields:	
	
Dl:	“There	are	n	object	o1,	…	on	which	form	a	set	U={o1,	…,	on}	and	a	relation	r	on	U	
such	that	r(om,	ok)	for	all	k=1,	…,	m-1	and	for	all	m=2,	…n.”	
	
This	 description	 specifies	 a	 structure	 ST	 with	 the	 domain	U={o1,	…,	on}	 and	 the	
relation	set	R={r}	of	relations	on	U.	Thus,	Dl	generates	ST=<U,	R>	via	Dl.		
	
This	 structure	 can	 now	 be	 embedded	 in	 other	 more	 elaborate	 structures.	
Different	 structures	 can	 be	 chosen,	 and	 different	morphisms	 can	 be	 used.	 For	
instance,	let	 〈!,≥〉 	be	the	set	of	the	natural	numbers	with	the	relation	≥ 	(greater	
than	or	 equal)	 defined	on	 them.	To	 apply	 the	 structure	 〈!,≥〉 	to	 the	 system	of	
rods	the	scientist	has	to	propose	that	there	is	a	mapping	 f :U → N 	such	that:	
																																																								
21	In	our	example	of	the	dynamics	of	a	population	this	allows	for	embedding	mappings	between	
discrete	 structures	 like	ST		and	 continuous	 structures	 involving	 ! ,	 as	used,	 for	 example,	 in	 the	
Lotka-Volterra	equations.	These	discrete-to-continuous	mappings	are	not	 restricted	 to	biology;	
see	Maddy’s	(1995,	pp.	254-255)	for	a	nice	discussion	of	Feynman’s	concerns	that	time	could	be	
discrete	despite	the	fact	continuous	structures	are	used	to	represent	it.	We	are	grateful	to	Mark	
Colyvan	for	bringing	this	example	to	our	attention.	
22	The	 classic	 source	 is	Krantz	 et.	 al’s	 (1971).	Brown	 (1999,	Ch.	 4)	offers	 an	 introduction;	Diez	
(1997a,	1997b)	provides	an	overview	of	the	development	of	the	theory.	
23	Those	who	worry	 that	 labeling	 rods	with	 numbers	 is	 already	 an	 application	 of	mathematics	
and	 that	Dl	therefore	presupposes	what	 it	 is	 supposed	 to	provide	 can	 replace	 the	names	ok	 by	
ordinary	proper	names	and	name	the	rods	“Jim”,	“Mina”,	“Emily”,	etc.		
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for	all	 
ox ,oy ∈U : 〈ox ,oy 〉 ∈r ↔ 〈 f (ox ), f (oy )〉 ∈≥ .	
	
If	 this	condition	 is	met	by	 f,	 then	we	can	say	that	the	application	of	 the	natural	
numbers	to	the	system	of	rods	is	successful	and	the	scientist	can	use	facts	about	
the	 ordering	 of	 the	 natural	 numbers	 to	 derive	 (simple)	 hypothesis	 about	 the	
ordering	of	the	rods	in	the	system	by	length.		
	
Much	of	the	theory	of	fundamental	measurement	is	concerned	with	the	choice	of	
the	 right	 structures	 and	 morphisms,	 and	 there	 are	 deep	 and	 interesting	
questions	 there.	 What	 matters	 in	 the	 present	 context	 is	 that	 constructing	 the	
structure	  〈U , R〉 	involved	 choices	 for	 the	 scientist	 at	 every	 step:	 a	 choice	
concerning	the	objects	 in	the	system;	a	choice	concerning	the	relevant	physical	
properties	and	relations;	and	a	choice	concerning	how	the	former	instantiate	the	
latter.	We	are	 led	astray	 if	we	think	that	 〈U , R〉 	simply	drops	out	of	 the	system	
because	 it’s	 somehow	 “natural”.	 〈U , R〉 	may	 seem	 natural	 because	 there	 are	
significant	 choices	 available	 to	 the	 scientist	 “upstream”	 of	 the	 application	 of	
mathematics,	choices	that	the	description	generating	the	structure	respects.	But	
this	 is	 an	ex	post	 facto	 judgement	 and	 countless	 alternative	descriptions	of	 the	
system	are	available,	including,	for	instance,	the	following:	
	
Dt:	“The	target	system	contains	rods	o1,	…,	on	and	these	enter	into	the	relation	rt	
=	thicker	than.”	
	
Dm:	“The	 target	 system	contains	 rods	o1,	…,	 on	and	 some	have	property	of	rm	=	
being	made	out	of	mahogany	and	others	rb	=	being	made	out	of	out	of	birch.”	
	
Dc:	 “The	 target	 system	 contains	molecules	 o1	 ,	…,	 om,	 some	 of	 which	 have	 the	
property	 of	 being	 rw	 =	 being	 water,	 and	 others	 have	 the	 property	 rc	 =	 being	
cellulose.”	
	
Each	of	these	descriptions	generates	a	different	structure.	So,	the	system	doesn’t	
have	a	unique	 “natural”	 structure	 that	 the	 scientist	 somehow	picks	up.	Rather,	
the	 scientist’s	 particular	 purposes	 for	 applying	mathematics	 are	 such	 that	 she	
has	to	make	a	decision	regarding	how	to	describe	the	physical	system	and	then	
the	description	chosen	provides	a	structure	for	her	to	work	with	when	applying	
mathematics.		
	
Three	observations	are	in	order.	First,	there	is	no	requirement	that	the	physical	
relations	referred	to	in	the	structure	generating	description	be	operationalized.	
In	some	cases	this	may	be	so,	but	in	others	it	may	not.	All	that	is	required	is	that	
the	relations	be	physical	relations.		
	
Second,	 there	 is	 also	 no	 expectation	 that	 we	 have	 access	 (either	 by	 direct	
acquaintance	 or	 through	 other	 sorts	 of	 observation)	 to	 the	 physical	 objects	 or	
relations	described	by	Ds.	The	elements	of	the	structure	can	be	hypothesized.	We	
can	ascribe	a	size	to	the	rabbit	population	hundred	years	from	now,	and	we	can	
specify	the	distance	between	two	atoms.	This	is	particularly	pertinent	in	cases	of	
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the	application	of	mathematics	in	the	more	“fundamental”	areas	of	physics.	Here,	
there	may	be	cases	where	the	physical	objects	and	relations	are	so	far	removed	
from	our	experience	that	it	is	difficult	to	see	how	we	could	have	a	good	grasp	of	a	
description	Ds	independent	of	the	mathematics	used	to	represent	them.		
	
Here	it’s	important	to	emphasise	the	distinction	between	an	agent	being	able	to	
offer	a	description	Ds,	and	that	agent	knowing	Ds	to	be	true.	Our	account	requires	
the	 former	 but	 not	 the	 latter	 –	 it	 suffices	 that	 such	 a	 description	 is	 given,	
regardless	of	whether	it’s	known	to	be	true	or	false.	If	Ds	also	happens	to	be	true,	
then	the	stage	 is	set	 for	a	successful	application	of	mathematics,	assuming	that	
the	structure	generated	by	the	description	 is	appropriately	morphic	with	some	
proposed	 mathematical	 structure.	 We	 take	 it	 that	 many	 cases	 in	 fundamental	
physics	 take	 this	 form.	The	atoms	 in	 a	 crystal	 are	 located	at	 a	 certain	distance	
from	each	other;	molecules	are	said	to	have	certain	size;	particles	in	the	standard	
model	 are	 described	 as	 having	 physically	meaningful	 properties	 like	mass	 and	
charge;	and	the	purported	fundamental	constituents	of	the	world	are	described	
as	having	the	shape	of	strings.		
	
Could	 there	 be	 cases	 where	 mathematics	 is	 “applied”,	 and	 yet	 no	 physical	
description	whatsoever	 is	 offered?	 Such	 cases	 could	 take	 one	 of	 two	 different	
forms:	either	such	a	description	is	assumed	to	exist	in	principle,	even	if	we	don’t	
currently	have	access	to	it,	or	such	a	description	is	claimed	not	to	exist	at	all.	In	
the	former	case,	if	we	knew	that	a	physically	rich	description	existed	in	principle	
then	presumably	we	could	in	practice	offer	something	like	the	following:	
	
Dx:	 “the	 target	 system	 contains	 some	 physical	 objects	 x1,	…,	 xn	and	 some	 have	
some	physical	property	r1	=	X1,	and	others	the	physical	property	r1	=	X2,	and	so	
on”,		
	
where	‘x’	and	‘X’	are	used	to	indicate	that	we	have	no	way	of	describing	what	the	
physical	objects	or	properties	are.	
	
Notice	 that	 such	 a	 description	 looks	 remarkably	 like	 a	 Ramsey-sentence,	 as	
associated	with	some	versions	of	epistemic	structural	realism	(for	an	overview	
see	 Frigg	 and	Votsis’	 (2011)).	On	 this	 view	 it’s	 not	 simply	 that	we	don’t	 know	
about	the	“nature”	of	the	objects	and	relations	in	the	world,	but	we	cannot	even	
describe	 them.	 In	 such	 cases	 we	 face	 a	 potential	 application	 of	 mathematics,	
which	becomes	an	application	proper	once	the	physical	descriptions	are	offered.				
	
In	 the	 latter	 case	 no	 physical	 description	 is	 given	 and	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 none	
exists,	even	in	principle.	In	such	a	case	it	seems	inappropriate	to	us	to	talk	about	
“applying”	mathematics	to	a	target.	Mathematics	is	used	to	generate	claims	about	
some	 system,	 but	 not	 in	 a	 way	 in	 which	 the	mapping	 account	 is	 supposed	 to	
capture.		
	
Third,	we	note	that	our	take	on	the	application	of	mathematics	is	consonant	with	
certain	prominent	views	about	models	and	data.	Hartmann	(1999)	and	Morgan	
(2001)	emphasise	that	models	come	accompanied	by	stories,	and	Muller	(2011)	
reminds	us	that	“all	actual	data	structures	float	in	sea	of	stories,	that	need	to	be	
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told	 in	order	 to	know	which	 data	are	 relevant	 for	which	 theory”	 (ibid.,	 p.	100).	
These	 observations	 were	 not	 intended	 as	 contributions	 to	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	
general	application	problem.	However,	they	are	made	in	contexts	where	the	use	
of	mathematical	 structures	 in	 science	 is	 discussed	 and	 so	 they	 can	 be	 seen	 as	
evidence	that,	at	least	implicitly,	a	view	very	similar	to	ours	is	assumed	in	these	
discussions.		
	
	
6.	Concluding	Remarks	
	
By	way	of	conclusion	we	want	to	make	a	few	observations	about	how	the	view	
we	developed	 in	 the	 last	 section	 relates	 to	other	 issues	 in	 connection	with	 the	
application	of	mathematics.	Let	us	 first	 return	 to	 the	explanation	problem	 that	
we	 introduced	 in	 Section	 2	 and	 then	 set	 aside.	 Bueno	 and	 Colyvan	 argue	 that	
simple	 versions	 of	 the	 mapping	 account	 have	 difficulty	 accounting	 for	
mathematical	explanations.24	They	argue	as	follows:	
	
“If	mathematics	 is	 genuinely	 explanatory,	 however,	 this	will	 present	 a	 serious	
problem	 for	 the	mapping	account.	The	problem	 is	 simply	 that	 it	 is	hard	 to	 see	
how	a	mere	representational	system	can	provide	explanations	and	yet	that	is	the	
only	 role	 mathematics	 is	 allowed	 to	 play	 in	 the	 mapping	 account.	 [footnote	
omitted]	Consider	once	again	our	map	of	a	city.	Certain	facts	about	the	city	will	
be	more	obvious	in	the	street	map—indeed,	that’s	the	purpose	of	a	street	map—
but	it	would	be	very	odd	to	think	of	the	map	as	providing	an	explanation	of	any	
facts	about	the	city”	(2011,	p.351).	
	
Bueno	and	Colyvan	are	right	in	pointing	out	that	a	representation	does	not	 ipso	
facto	double	as	an	explanation.	This,	however,	does	not	preclude	representations	
from	 playing	 a	 role	 in	 explanations.	 A	 representation	 can	 contain	 information	
that	 is	 explanatorily	 relevant.	 The	 London	 tube	 map,	 for	 instance,	 does	 not	
explain	why	 one	 cannot	 get	 directly	 from	 Brixton	 to	 Stratford.	 But	 it	 contains	
information	that	 is	explanatorily	relevant,	namely	that	 the	two	stations	are	not	
on	 the	 same	 line.	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 a	 mathematical	 structure	 may	 contain	
information	 that	 is	 explanatorily	 relevant	 even	 though	 the	 structure	 as	 such	 is	
not	 an	 explanation.	 Depending	 on	 one’s	 account	 of	 explanation	 one	 will	
recognise	 different	 pieces	 of	 information	 as	 explanatorily:	 counterfactual	
dependence,	 law-like	 connections,	 causal	 relations,	 the	 use	 of	 unificatory	
patterns,	and	so	on.	 Information	of	 this	kind	can	be	encoded	in	a	mathematical	
formalism,	and	by	connecting	 the	 formalism	to	 the	 target	 the	mapping	account	
makes	 this	 information	 relevant	 for	 a	 target	 system.	 In	 this	 way	 the	mapping	
account	 is	 indeed	 an	 important	 ingredient	 in	 any	 mathematical	 explanation	
because	without	a	mapping	a	mathematical	 formalism	would	be	 “free	 floating”	
and	 have	 no	 bearing	 on	 the	 target	 in	 question.	Hence,	while	 a	 structure	 that’s	
mapped	 to	 target	 is	 not	 ipso	 facto	 an	 explanation,	 the	 existence	 of	 such	 a	
																																																								
24	Recall	 that	 Bueno	 and	 Colyvan	 describe	 their	 account	 as	 an	 “inferential”	 conception	 of	 the	
application	of	mathematics,	 rather	 than	a	mapping	account,	 and	 they	 take	 it	 that	 their	account	
has	the	resources	to	account	for	mathematics	playing	an	explanatory	role.	They	take	it	that	it	is	
the	choice	of	mapping	at	the	interpretation	and	immersion	stages	that	allows	explanations	to	be	
obtained	(2011,	p.	366).		
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mapping	is	a	precondition	for	(at	least	some	kinds	of)	explanation.		
	
An	issue	that	that	arises	in	connection	with	the	view	developed	in	the	last	section	
is	 nominalism.	 By	 anchoring	 structures	 in	 physical	 descriptions,	 aren’t	 we	
implicitly	 committing	 to	nominalism?	There	are	 two	observations	 that	 seem	to	
pull	 into	 that	 direction.	 The	 first	 is	 that	 by	 anchoring	 structures	 in	 something	
physical	 we	 reduce	 structures	 to	 the	 physical	 and	 hence	make	 them	 obsolete.	
This	is	too	quick.	Firstly,	although	the	structure	of	a	target	may	be	anchored	to	a	
physical	description,	our	account	does	not	preclude	 the	existence	of	 structures	
not	 so	 anchored	 –	 the	 structures	 proposed	 to	 be	 appropriately	 morphic	 to	 a	
target	 structure	 do	 not	 in	 fact	 need	 to	 be	 anchored.	 Secondly,	 our	 discussion	
attempts	to	elucidate	what	it	means	for	a	target	to	have	a	certain	structure,	but	
this	is	metaphysically	neutral.	Consider	the	analogy	with	ordinary	objects:	that	a	
table	consists	of	atoms	and	that	the	atoms	are	arranged	in	certain	way	does	not	
prove	that	the	table	is	unreal.	Of	course	some	may	want	to	draw	this	conclusion;	
we’re	just	pointing	out	that	the	conclusion	is	not	forced	on	us	and	can	indeed	be	
resisted	(Korman	2016).	Likewise,	showing	that	for	something	to	have	a	certain	
structure	requires	certain	other	things	to	be	the	case	does	not	by	itself	prove	that	
there	are	no	structures.25		
	
Finally,	we	adopted	a	structuralist	approach	to	mathematics	and	presented	the	
mapping	 account	 as	 the	 invocation	 of	 a	 proposed	 morphism	 between	 the	
structure	of	the	target	system	and	a	mathematical	structure,	and	our	account	of	
structure	 generating	 descriptions	 provided	 a	 story	 for	 how	 the	 former	 is	
generated.	What	becomes	of	our	response	to	the	general	application	problem	if	
one	 changes	 the	 philosophy	 of	 mathematics	 and	 doesn’t	 subscribe	 to	
structuralism?	 Are	 our	 structure	 generating	 descriptions	 useful	 from	 the	
perspective	of	other	accounts	of	mathematics?	We	think	so.	But	because	of	space	
limitations	we	can	only	gesture	at	some	important	cases.		
	
For	 a	 Platonist,	 mathematics	 is	 the	 study	 of	 mathematical	 objects:	 the	 natural	
numbers	 are	 not	 a	 structure	 or	 pattern,	 but	 rather	 objects	 that	 exist	
independently	in	some	isolated	Platonic	realm.	But	Platonic	objects	presumably	
still	have	a	structure	(even	though	they	are	not	 identified	with	structures),	and	
hence	the	mapping	account	can	get	a	grip	on	these	objects	in	the	same	way	as	it	
does	 for	 the	 mathematical	 structuralist	 by	 prosing	 a	 mapping	 between	 the	
structure	of	Platonic	objects	and	the	structure	of	a	target	system	as	identified	by	
DS.		
	
For	the	formalist	things	look	different.	There	is	no	subject	matter	of	mathematics	
per	 se:	 mathematics	 is	 the	 study	 of	 systems	 of	 syntactic	 objects	 and	 rules	 for	
manipulating	 them.	 Mathematical	 application	 from	 this	 perspective	 can	 be	
thought	of	as	providing	a	physical	interpretation	of	the	terms	in	the	systems,	and	
																																																								
25	It’s	worth	noting	here	that	nothing	we	say	in	this	paper	has	any	bearing	on	other	arguments	for	
or	against	nominalism,	for	example	appeals	to	the	scientific	practice	of	representing	non-actual	
states	of	systems	via	phase	spaces	(Lyon	and	Colyvan	2008),	or	whether,	once	a	representation	
theorem	has	been	proven,	everything	that	might	be	said	about	the	mathematical	structure	can	be	
rephrased	in	terms	of	the	empirical	structure	(see	Balaguer's	(1998,	p.	112)	and	Pincock’s	(2007,	
Sec.	III)	for	further	discussion).	
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investigating	which	conclusions	are	generated	by	applying	the	rules	to	the	result.	
If	so,	our	Ds	can	be	thought	of	as	specifying	which	physical	objects	and	properties	
feature	 in	 the	 interpretations	 (this	 is	 reminiscent	 of	Hilbert’s	 remark	 that	 in	 a	
proper	axiomatisation	of	geometry	 “one	must	always	be	able	 to	 say,	 instead	of	
‘points,	 straight	 lines,	 and	 planes’,	 ‘tables,	 chairs,	 and	 beer	 mugs’”).26	Similar	
considerations	 apply	 to	 what	 Shapiro	 (1983,	 pp.	 529-531)	 calls	 “postulate	
logicism”,	 i.e.	 the	 study	 of	 the	 logical	 consequences	 of	 uninterpreted	 sets	 of	
axioms.	Again,	Ds	provides	a	way	of	 interpreting	the	axioms	physically,	and	the	
logical	consequences	of	these	axioms	are	the	claims	generated	by	the	application	
of	mathematics.		
	
For	 the	 intuitionist,	 mathematical	 statements	 are	 about	 mathematical	 objects,	
but	these	are	mental	constructs.	How	to	think	about	mathematical	application	in	
this	framework	is	not	straightforward,	but	one	possibility	it	is	to	adopt	a	Kantian	
perspective	 whereby	 the	 human	 mind	 plays	 an	 active	 role	 in	 perceiving	 and	
understanding	the	world	(Shapiro	1983,	p.	533).	Our	Ds	 then	don’t	describe	an	
objective	world,	but	describe	a	world	as	perceived	and	understood	by	a	human	
mind.	 An	 intuitionist	 about	 mathematics	 could	 then	 try	 to	 account	 for	 the	
application	of	mathematics	by	establishing	a	relationship	between	mathematical	
mental	constructs	and	perceptual	mental	constructs,	 constructs	as	provided	by	
Ds.		
	
Each	of	these	positions	deserves	further	research.	Regardless	of	the	philosophy	
of	 mathematics	 adopted,	 one	 would	 hope	 that	 applications	 of	 mathematics	
would	 distinguish	 between	 applying	 mathematics	 to	 the	 system	 under	 one	
description	and	under	another.	By	explicating	this	we	hope	to	have	made	inroads	
in	understanding	how	mathematics	applies	to	the	physical	world.		
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